Can You Be a Feminist and a Criminal Defense Lawyer? by Smith, Abbe
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2020 
Can You Be a Feminist and a Criminal Defense Lawyer? 
Abbe Smith 
Georgetown University Law Center, smithal@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2273 
 
American Criminal Law Review, Vol. 57, Issue 4, 1569. 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
CAN YOU BE A FEMINIST AND A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 
LAWYER? 
Abbe Smith*  
INTRODUCTION 
Young people in the current cultural generation seem to like the word “literally.” 
They use it often and with great feeling, though not necessarily accurately. Law 
students will exclaim, for example, that the length of reading assignments is “liter-
ally killing them.” Young public defenders will complain that judges and prosecu-
tors are “literally driving them crazy.” My son sometimes claims that he is 
“literally starving to death.” I can’t help replying to each, “Well, maybe not 
literally.” 
But the answer to the question I pose in this Essay is literally self-evident, for I 
am both a feminist and a criminal defense lawyer. I have been both of these things 
for more than thirty years. So yes, of course, one can be a feminist and a criminal 
defense lawyer: here I am. 
Moreover, I have answered this question many times in nearly everything I have 
written since becoming a law professor. Both my scholarly1 and more popular writ-
ing2 
See, e.g., Abbe Smith, How Can You Defend Harvey Weinstein? Duty., WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-can-anyone-defend-harvey-weinstein-duty/2019/03/20/25f6c920- 
4759-11e9-90f0-0ccfeec87a61_story.html; Abbe Smith, How Can You Represent Those People? Hillary Clinton 
and Other Feminist Lawyers are Right to Defend Alleged Rapists, SLATE (April 23, 2015) [hereinafter Smith, 
Hillary Clinton and Other Feminist Lawyers are Right to Defend Alleged Rapists], http://www.slate.com/articles/ 
news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/04/hillary_clinton_defended_an_alleged_rapists_feminist_lawyers_are_ 
right_to.html; Abbe Smith, Would You Defend Him? What Motivates a Lawyer to Defend a Tsarnaev, a Castro or 
a Zimmerman? WASH. POST (July 28, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/what-motivates-a-lawyer- 
to-defend-a-tsarnaev-a-castro-or-a-zimmerman/2013/07/25/e81737e8-f2e5-11e2-ae43-b31dc363c3bf_story.html. 
are from the experience and perspective of a feminist criminal defense lawyer. 
* Professor of Law, Director of the Criminal Defense & Prisoner Advocacy Clinic, Co-Director of the E. 
Barrett Prettyman Fellowship Program, Georgetown University Law Center. With thanks to Andrea Fenster, 
Holly Travis, and Juliana Wishne for excellent research assistance, and Susan Brooks and Ilene Seidman for 
helpful discussions. This Essay is dedicated to Barbara Allen Babcock, one of the greatest feminist criminal 
defense lawyers of all time. © 2020, Abbe Smith. 
1. See, e.g., ABBE SMITH, GUILTY PEOPLE (2020); ABBE SMITH, CASE OF A LIFETIME: A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 
LAWYER’S STORY (2008) [hereinafter SMITH, CASE OF A LIFETIME]; Abbe Smith, Representing Rapists: The 
Cruelty of Cross-Examination and Other Challenges for a Feminist Criminal Defense Lawyer, 53 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 255 (2016) [hereinafter Smith, Representing Rapists]; Abbe Smith & Ilene Seidman, Lawyers for the 
Abused, Lawyers for the Accused: An Interfaith Marriage, 47 LOY. L. REV. 415 (2001); Abbe Smith, On 
Representing a Victim of Crime, in LAW STORIES (Gary Bellow & Martha Minow eds., 1996); Abbe Smith, 
Criminal Responsibility, Social Responsibility, and Angry Young Men: Reflections of a Feminist Criminal 
Defense Lawyer, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 433 (1994); Abbe Smith, Rosie O’Neill Goes to Law 
School: The Clinical Education of a Sensitive New Age Public Defender, 28 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1993). 
2. 
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The fact that I am a feminist is interwoven into the way I practice criminal law and 
how I think about it. 
It would be nice to end this project here. Pithy legal scholarship is virtually 
unheard of in the twenty-first century.3 
See Eric Segall, The Future of Lengthy Law Review Scholarship, DORF ON LAW (Apr. 9, 2018), http://www. 
dorfonlaw.org/2018/04/the-future-of-lengthy-law-review.html (referring to the “lengthy, footnote heavy, and 
often wildly theoretical law review articles[s] . . . published every year, most of which die in a vacuum”). 
But the question about feminism and crimi-
nal defense seems to keep coming up, lately with new urgency because of height-
ened awareness about sexual assault. 
Consider, for example, the renewed media focus on Hillary Clinton’s represen-
tation of an alleged child rapist in Arkansas in 1975 in the lead-up to the 2016 pres-
idential election. Commentators wondered how Clinton, who had dedicated much 
of her professional life to advocating for women and children, could have defended 
such a criminal.4 
See Amy Chozick, Clinton Defends Her Handling of a Rape Case in 1975, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/08/us/08clinton.html (reporting that Clinton said she took the case at the 
request of both a prosecutor and judge out of “professional duty”); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 
6.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“A lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a person 
except for good cause.”). 
A meme about the case, in which Clinton is said to have “volun-
teered” to “free” a rapist she “knew . . . was guilty” and then “laughed about it,” 
went viral, even though these claims were false.5 
Kim Lacapria & David Mikkelson, Did Hillary Clinton Free a Child Rapist? SNOPES (May 2, 2016), 
https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/hillary-clinton-freed-child-rapist-laughed-about-it/ (reporting about a false 
meme about the case that went viral). 
The truth was that Clinton was 
appointed to represent an indigent criminal defendant accused of child rape 
(though whether she volunteered or was appointed should be of no moment), liti-
gated the case well, and obtained a favorable plea.6 
The Clinton kerfuffle was mere foreshadowing. A year later came the seismic cul-
tural shift of the #MeToo movement against sexual assault and harassment. Fueled 
by multiple sexual abuse allegations against Hollywood producer Harvey Weinstein 
in 2017 and similar allegations against other celebrities soon thereafter,7 
See generally JODI KANTOR & MEGAN TWOHEY, SHE SAID: BREAKING THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT STORY 
THAT HELPED IGNITE A MOVEMENT (2019) (New York Times reporters recounting their investigation into sexual 
harassment and assault allegations against Harvey Weinstein); RONAN FARROW, CATCH AND KILL: LIES, SPIES, 
AND A CONSPIRACY TO PROTECT PREDATORS (2019) (New Yorker Magazine reporter recounting his investigation 
into Weinstein); see also Jane Mayer, The Case of Al Franken, NEW YORKER (July 29, 2019), https://www. 
newyorker.com/magazine/2019/07/29/the-case-of-al-franken (noting the “allegations of egregious sexual 
misconduct” against Weinstein, followed by similar allegations against Louis C.K., Mark Halperin, Charlie 
Rose, Matt Lauer, Russell Simmons, and John Conyers, all of which resulted in “serious repercussions”). 
women 
who had been abused by powerful men—often in secrecy, protected by others, with 
the men seemingly immune from consequences—were suddenly bringing them 
down. It was miraculous and empowering, and the sides were clearly drawn: either 
stand by your sisters at this crucial cultural moment or defend the bad guys. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. Id.; see also Smith, Hillary Clinton and Other Feminist Lawyers are Right to Defend Alleged Rapists, supra 
note 2. 
7. 
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Many feminists seemed to embrace the credo of the #MeToo movement: 
“Believe Women,” no matter what.8 
See Monica Hesse, Do We Really ‘Believe Women’? How the Kavanaugh Accusation Will Put a Slogan to 
the Test, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/do-we-really-believe- 
women-how-the-kavanaugh-accusation-will-put-a-slogan-to-the-test/2018/09/16/c8a7405e-b9f2-11e8-a8aa- 
860695e7f3fc_story.html (noting that “shortly after #MeToo spread as a hashtag and shorthand, a companion 
phrase also emerged: ‘Believe women’”). 
As New Yorker writer Jane Mayer notes, now 
that “women’s accusations of sexual discrimination and harassment are finally 
being taken seriously, after years of belittlement and dismissal,” some find it “of-
fensive” to even “subject accusers to scrutiny.”9 Apparently, if you are a #MeToo 
supporter, every allegation of sexual assault is true. 
This is especially troubling in a criminal context. Even when the stakes are at 
their highest, not only must we stand by all women accusers, not question their 
accounts, and never take a man’s word over a woman’s, but apparently we must 
regard every purported instance of sexual abuse as equally heinous and equally 
worthy of the harshest criminal punishment.10 Hence, according to the #MeToo 
view embraced by many feminists, neither due process nor the principle of propor-
tionality11 
See generally AHARON BARAK. PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS 
(2012) (discussing proportionality as a general constitutional matter); see also John Deigh, Punishment and 
Proportionality, 33 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 185 (2014) (arguing that proportional punishment means that the 
offender receive the minimal amount of pain or loss necessary to preserve social order); Eisha Jain, 
Proportionality and Other Misdemeanor Myths, 98 B.U. L. REV. 953 (2018) (critically examining misdemeanor 
punishment from the perspective of proportionality); Judith Lichtenberg, How US Prisons Violate Three 
Principles of Criminal Justice, BIG THINK (Mar. 16, 2018), https://bigthink.com/aeon-ideas/how-us-prisons- 
violate-three-principles-of-criminal-justice (arguing that the US has violated core principles of criminal justice, 
including proportionality, in its current approach to criminal punishment). 
applies to sex cases. 
In this Essay, I will not talk about the importance of defending factually inno-
cent men criminally accused of sexual assault.12 This should not be controversial 
for anyone, feminist or not.13 Nor will I discuss the long and ugly history of black 
men being falsely accused of rape in this country, usually by white women.14 The 
8. 
9. Mayer, The Case of Al Franken, supra note 7. 
10. But see Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 584 (1977) (holding that the death penalty for rape violates the 
Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment as grossly disproportionate to the crime). 
11. 
12. See, e.g., WHEN THEY SEE US (Netflix 2019) (devastating four-part television miniseries about the 
wrongful prosecution and imprisonment of five innocent young black men for the rape of a white jogger in 
Central Park in 1989); THE CENTRAL PARK FIVE (Sundance Selects/PBS 2012) (documentary about the same 
case). These films are essential watching for anyone concerned about criminal justice in the United States. 
13. See generally SMITH, CASE OF A LIFETIME, supra note 1 (the author recounting her representation of an 
innocent woman who served 28 years in prison); Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 175, 180 (1983) (noting how “grueling” and important defending the innocent is); Robert P. Mosteller, Why 
Defense Attorneys Cannot, But Do, Care About Innocence, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) (pointing out 
that, inevitably, if uncharacteristically, defense lawyers care about innocence). 
14. For a riveting account of one such case, see GILBERT KING, DEVIL IN THE GROVE: THURGOOD MARSHALL, 
THE GROVELAND BOYS, AND THE DAWN OF A NEW AMERICA (2012) (recounting the true story of four young 
black men accused of raping a white woman in Lake County, Florida, in 1949). See also DAN T. CARTER, 
SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (rev. ed. 2007) (recounting the true story of nine young 
black men ranging in age from twelve to nineteen accused of raping two white women in northeastern Alabama 
in 1931). 
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vestiges of Jim Crow persist;15 race and rape have always been deeply intertwined 
in our criminal legal system and ought to be of concern to all lawyers and non- 
lawyers, feminist or not.16 
Instead, I will try to identify and address the hard questions for feminist criminal 
defense lawyers today, in both theory and practice. I focus on sex cases because 
these cases seem to provoke the most conflict for young feminists. In so doing, I 
first discuss the obligations of feminism in a time of over-criminalization and mass 
incarceration,17 
See generally Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019, PRISON POLICY 
INITIATIVE (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2019.html (reporting that the American 
criminal justice system holds almost 2.3 million people in 1,719 state prisons, 109 federal prisons, 1,772 juvenile 
correctional facilities, 3,163 local jails, and 80 Indian Country jails as well as in military prisons, immigration 
detention facilities, civil commitment centers, state psychiatric hospitals, and prisons in the U.S. territories). If 
you include the 4.4 million people on parole or probation in the US, the grand total of people under the control of 
the criminal legal system is 6.7 million. Id. People of color, especially African Americans, are disproportionately 
represented in our nation’s prisons and jails. While African Americans are only 13 percent of US residents, they 
make up 40% of the incarcerated population. Id. Contrary to what many people think, incarcerated drug 
offenders are not the reason we have mass incarceration; the main driver is “violent” state crime—which 
includes a wide variety of offenses, some of which are not very violent at all. Id. 
as well as the obligations of criminal defenders in a time of height-
ened awareness about sexual assault and sexual violence, and how to reconcile 
these things. I then use two cases—the Brock Turner (Stanford swimmer case) and 
a more typical case not in the public eye (involving an African American man serv-
ing a lengthy sentence for rape)—in order to make more concrete how a feminist 
defender might think about these kinds of cases. 
As I note above, this Essay is in many ways what I have been writing about my 
entire academic career. It is the “feminist subset” of the Cocktail Party Question: 
How Can You Represent Those People?18 It is also an exhortation to young femi-
nists contemplating a career in criminal law to become defenders rather than prose-
cutors,19 
See Linda Hirshman, Remember that the Prosecution of the Central Park Five Failed Women, Too, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/opinion/central-park-five.html (noting that the 
“Manhattan district attorney’s sex crimes unit was . . . a potent expression of the feminist movement” during the 
wrongful prosecution of the Central Park Five). 
and perhaps a little vindication for those feminist defenders who have 
been doing the work for years.20 More and more women seem to be entering law 
15. In many ways, the Central Park Five can be seen as a latter-day version of the Scottsboro Boys. See WHEN 
THEY SEE US, supra note 12; THE CENTRAL PARK FIVE, supra note 12. 
16. For important discussions of the interconnectedness of race and rape, see Angela Harris, Race and 
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 598–601 (1990) (pointing out that, historically, 
rape was something that happened to white women, not black women, and it “signified the terrorism of black 
men by white men, aided and abetted, passively (by silence) or actively (by ‘crying rape’), by white women”); 
Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape, Violence, and Women’s Autonomy, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 359, 362–69 (1993) 
(discussing the racialized meaning of rape); Jennifer Wriggins, Note, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 103, 103 (1983) (discussing rape and race from a feminist perspective and noting that the “history 
of rape in this country has focused on the rape of white women by Black men”). 
17. 
18. See generally HOW CAN YOU REPRESENT THOSE PEOPLE? (Abbe Smith & Monroe H. Freedman eds., 
2013) (collection of essays by criminal lawyers and legal academics answering the “Cocktail Party Question”). 
19. 
20. I think of feminist defenders like Cris Arguedes, Barbara Babcock, Blair Berk, Jennifer Brown, Judy 
Clarke, Angela J. Davis, Alison Flaum; Nancy Gertner, Aya Gruber, Carey Haughwout, Vida Johnson, Holly 
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school interested in criminal defense, and many public defender offices are nearing 
equal numbers of men and women.21 
I could find no empirical support for this assertion, but it reflects my experience and that of others in the 
public defense community. See Phyllis Subin, Have Gender Bias and the Glass Ceiling Been Shattered in the 
#Me Too Era?, NAT’L ASS’N FOR PUB. DEF. (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.publicdefenders.us/ev_calendar_day. 
asp?date=11/26/ 2019&eventid=162 (discussing women in public defense in the recent past and today). 
I wanted to give these women defenders 
something that explicitly answers this question. 
I. “FEMINISM” IN A TIME OF MASS INCARCERATION 
Feminism is not one-dimensional. It is a movement, an ideology, and a method. 
Its most basic aim is to achieve gender equality, but this is a simplistic rendering of 
feminism. Feminism includes a range of socio-political movements and ideologies 
that seek to define and achieve the political, economic, social, and personal equality 
of the sexes.22 Feminist theory seeks to understand the nature of gender inequality— 
and the nature of gender itself—by examining women’s (and men’s) social roles 
and lived experience.23 Taking women’s lived experience seriously is also a key 
feminist method.24 There is liberal feminism, radical feminism, Marxist-femi-
nism, post-modern feminism, critical race feminism, and intersectional femi-
nism.25 In the United States, feminism came in different waves. The first wave 
was the movement for women’s suffrage in the nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries.26 The second wave was the women’s liberation movement for legal and 
social equality in the 1960s.27 The third wave started in the early 1990s and 
focused on diversity, individual variability, intersectionality, and queer theory.28 
Maguigan, Patricia McInerney, Erin Murphy, Cookie Ridolfi, Michele Roberts, Ann Roan, Jill Paperno, Cookie 
Polan, Catherine Roraback, Maureen Rowley, Alison Siegler, Shelley Stark, Robin Steinberg, Phyllis Subin, and 
Ellen Yaroshefsky, among others. 
21. 
22. See generally Catharine A. Mackinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination (Oct. 24, 
1984), in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32 (1987); Kimberle´ Crenshaw, Mapping the 
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 
(1991); Sandra Harding, The Instability of the Analytical Categories of Feminist Theory, 11 SIGNS 645 (1986); 
Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988); Wendy W. Williams, Notes From A First 
Generation, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 99, 99–113. 
23. See Harding, The Instability of the Analytical Categories of Feminist Theory, supra note 22, at 646–47; 
West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 22, at 28. 
24. See generally FEMINISM IN OUR TIME: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS, WORLD WAR II TO THE PRESENT 
(Miriam Schnier ed., 1994) (historically informed sourcebook by prominent feminist historian on the intellectual 
and political underpinnings of contemporary feminism); THE ESSENTIAL FEMINIST READER (Estelle B. Freedman 
ed., 2007) (similar feminist sourcebook but with a broader international focus). 
25. See generally NANCY F. COTT, THE GROUNDING OF MODERN FEMINISM (1989); RORY C. DICKER, A 
HISTORY OF U.S. FEMINISMS (2016). 
26. See generally COTT, supra note 25; DICKER, supra note 25. 
27. See generally DICKER, supra note 25; JUDITH EVANS, FEMINIST THEORY TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
SECOND WAVE FEMINISM (1995); ESTELLE FREEDMAN, NO TURNING BACK: THE HISTORY OF FEMINISM AND THE 
FUTURE OF WOMEN (2002). 
28. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990) (prominent 
philosopher and gender theorist discussing feminism). 
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The fourth wave started around 2012 and focused on “rape culture,” which helped 
give rise to the #MeToo movement.29 
Feminism that is one-dimensional, or one-issue-oriented, is problematic. It has 
historically been too white, too middle-class, too economic rights-driven, and too 
victims’ rights-driven. The victims’ rights focus has morphed into what is now 
called “carceral feminism,” which regards increased policing, prosecution, and 
imprisonment as the primary solution to violence against women.30 This brand of 
feminism too often embraces criminal punishment as the answer to a variety of 
complex and entrenched social problems and, sadly, has contributed to mass 
incarceration.31 
I prefer, instead, the activists and commentators who reject carceral feminism 
and are developing a deeply feminist approach to crime and punishment. This 
approach includes restorative justice and a focus on institutional and cultural 
responsibility for gendered violence, rather than individual punishment.32 
See KRISTIN BUMILLER, IN AN ABUSIVE STATE: HOW NEOLIBERALISM APPROPRIATED THE FEMINIST 
MOVEMENT AGAINST SEXUAL VIOLENCE (2008) (arguing that the U.S. criminal legal system and social welfare 
apparatus appropriated the feminist movement against sexual violence, stifling women’s autonomy, producing 
over-criminalization, and propagating the “black stranger” rape narrative); LEIGH GOODMARK, DECRIMINALIZING 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A BALANCED POLICY APPROACH TO INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE (2018) (arguing that 
the criminal legal system harms rather than helps those who are subjected to abuse and violence in their homes 
and communities and urging a restorative justice approach); GRUBER, supra note 30 (arguing that feminists 
should redirect their efforts from crime control and punishment toward challenging structures that subordinate 
women and other disadvantaged minorities); BETH RICHIE, ARRESTED JUSTICE: BLACK WOMEN, VIOLENCE, AND 
AMERICA’S PRISON NATION (2012) (arguing that black women face particular peril because of the ways that race 
and culture have not been sufficiently considered in the analysis of the causes and consequences of gender 
violence); see also Victoria Law, Against Carceral Feminism, JACOBIN MAG. (Oct. 17, 2014), https://www. 
jacobinmag.com/2014/10/against-carceral-feminism/ (arguing that relying on state violence—including the 
Violence Against Women Act—to curb domestic violence only ends up harming the most marginalized women); 
Dianne L. Martin, Retribution Revisited: A Reconsideration of Feminists Criminal Law Reform Strategies, 36 
OSGOOD HALL L.J. 151, 158 (1998) (noting that a punitive, retribution-driven agenda now constitutes the public 
face of the women’s movement and arguing that feminists have been co-opted by the New Right); Allegra M. 
McLeod, Regulating Sexual Harm: Strangers, Intimates, and Social Institutional Reform, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 
1553, 1553 (2014) [hereinafter McLeod, Regulating Sexual Harm] (arguing that criminal regulation of “sexual 
harm” in the U.S. is overbroad, overly harsh, and neglects the most prevalent forms of vulnerability to sexual 
assault within families, schools, churches, prisons, and the military, and proposing an alternative reform 
framework focusing on institutional, structural, and social dynamics). 
These 
29. See, e.g., Melanie Dellplain, Can a Feminist Defend a Rapist?: The Ethics of Legal Representation, 31 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 583, 593–600 (2018) (summarizing modern feminist thinking on sexual assault). 
30. See generally AYA GRUBER, THE FEMINIST WAR ON CRIME: THE UNEXPECTED ROLE OF WOMEN’S 
LIBERATION IN MASS INCARCERATION (2020) (critiquing carceral feminism, which refers to the feminist embrace 
of the criminal legal system to solve or curtail gender-based violence). 
31. See Aya Gruber, Neofeminism, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1325, 1354 (2013) (critiquing the reliance of second 
wave feminists on criminal law and criminal punishment to address male violence); Aya Gruber, Rape, 
Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 659 (2009) (same); see also Elizabeth Bernstein, 
Militarized Humanitarianism Meets Carceral Feminism: The Politics of Sex, Rights, and Freedom in 
Contemporary Antitrafficking Campaigns, 36 SIGNS 45, 57 (2010) (same); Janet Halley, Rape in Berlin: 
Reconsidering the Criminalisation of Rape in the International Law of Armed Conflict, 9 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 
78 (2008) (same); Genevieve LeBaron & Adrienne Roberts, Toward a Feminist Political Economy of Capitalism 
and Carcerality, 36 SIGNS 19, 21 (2010) (same). 
32. 
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feminists are concerned about both victims and perpetrators of crime, recognizing 
that these labels are overly binary, and the lines sometimes porous.33 They under-
stand that the cycle of violence runs deep; trauma is a chief contributor; childhood 
experiences like abuse, neglect, and witnessing violence play a significant role in 
whether a person will bring violence home; and prison often produces more 
trauma.34 
One of these activists is a student of mine, Stefanie Mundhenk Harrelson, who 
was raped by someone she considered a friend while an undergraduate at Baylor 
University.35 
See Stefanie Mundhenk Harrelson, I Was Sexually Assaulted. And I Believe Incarcerating Rapists Doesn’t 
Help Victims Like Me., APPEAL (July 18, 2019), https://theappeal.org/i-was-sexually-assaulted-and-i-believe- 
incarcerating-rapists-doesnt-help-victims-like-me/. 
Her path is not as extraordinary as one might think.36 
One notable rape victim who became an activist for criminal justice reform is Jennifer Thompson- 
Cannino, who was raped at knifepoint by a stranger when she was a college student in North Carolina in 1984. As 
a result of a suggestive photo display, she identified an innocent man named Ronald Cotton as her rapist. He was 
subsequently tried, convicted, and imprisoned for eleven years for the crime. Cotton was released when a DNA 
test proved that another man had committed the rape. See JENNIFER THOMPSON-CANNINO & RONALD COTTON, 
PICKING COTTON: OUR MEMOIR OF REDEMPTION AND INJUSTICE (2008). Another is Carey Houghwout, the Chief 
Public Defender in Palm Beach County, FL, who was also raped at knifepoint by a stranger while a college 
student. Haughwout worried about the incompetence of police officers who “plodded about” in the aftermath of 
her attack, likely destroying the crime scene. Anxiety turned to anger a few weeks later when police tried to 
pressure her into identifying someone from a lineup after she insisted that none of the men there resembled her 
attacker. See Daphne Duret et al., Sharp Contrast Stands Out in Public Defenders Carey Houghwoutt and 
Diamond Litty, PALM BEACH POST (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/20181129/sharp- 
contrast-stands-out-in-public-defenders-carey-haughwout-and-diamond-litty. 
She wanted two 
things in the aftermath of her attack: to heal from the physical and emotional 
trauma, and for her rapist not to assault anyone else.37 She initially thought the best 
way to accomplish these goals was through the criminal legal system.38 But she was 
told by the local police department that no “sane” prosecutor would ever go forward 
with the case because she had no eyewitnesses and the accused was claiming con-
sent.39 The University’s internal disciplinary process was even worse, reinforcing at 
every turn the message that the female student was not sufficiently credible to 
uphold such an accusation.40 The accused male student was never held to account, 
and there was no moment of reckoning or “closure” for anyone involved.41 
33. See Abbe Smith, The “Monster” in All of Us: When Victims Become Perpetrators, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
367–94 (2005) (using the story of convicted murderer Aileen Wuornos to discuss the often porous line between 
victims and perpetrators). 
34. See Leigh Goodmark, How Not to Stop Domestic Violence, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2019, at A27. 
35. 
36. 
37. See Harrelson, supra note 35. 
38. I generally use the term “criminal legal system” instead of the more conventional “criminal justice 
system,” because there is hardly any justice in our criminal system. 
39. See Harrelson, supra note 35. 
40. See generally Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman, Discounting Women: Doubting Domestic Violence 
Survivors’ Credibility and Dismissing Their Experiences, 167 U. PENN. L. REV. 399 (2019) (documenting the 
degree to which women survivors of intimate violence face a Gaslight-style gauntlet of doubt, disbelief, and 
outright dismissal of their stories). 
41. See Harrelson, supra note 35 (noting that, after the male student was found “not responsible” for the 
assault, she was initially given lip service and then blown off by the university president). 
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Harrelson is now a critic of conventional adversarial approaches to crime and an 
advocate for restorative justice. She includes rape among the crimes that would be 
better addressed in an alternative system that “center[s] the needs of victims.”42 
She believes that even if we could increase the historically low prosecution rates 
for rape—which her own experience with the police illustrates—we would still not 
serve the interests of victims. The “carceral machine,” as she calls it, only produces 
trauma—to both victims and perpetrators.43 Victims suffer because the criminal 
legal process operates to deny them the power and control they need to heal largely 
by limiting their ability to make choices about when, how, and with whom to share 
their story. Perpetrators suffer when justice is defined only by how many years 
they must spend in a cage and not by their ability to acknowledge responsibility, 
take action to repair the harm, and change.44 
Harrelson speaks hopefully of restorative justice as a way of re-conceptualizing 
how we respond to criminal wrongdoing. Instead of regarding crime in narrow 
terms as a violation of law requiring punishment, restorative justice regards crime 
as an infliction of harm best redressed by bringing together those who have caused 
the harm and those who have experienced it to create a meaningful plan of repair.45 
Kathleen Daly, one of the first feminists to study restorative justice,46 is also op-
timistic about its promise. But she cautions that there is no single definition for 
what restorative justice means and no consensus on what practices should be 
included within its reach.47 
Kathleen Daly, The Limits of Restorative Justice, in HANDBOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: A GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE (Dennis Sullivan & Larry Tifft eds., 2006), http://www.antoniocasella.eu/restorative/Daly_2005. 
pdf; see also Daly & Hayes, supra note 46. 
Moreover, there is disagreement about whether restora-
tive justice should be viewed as a process, an outcome, or a set of values, and 
whether it might exist within established criminal justice systems.48 
Daly identifies the core elements of restorative justice as:  
� Deal[ing] with the penalty (or post-penalty), not fact-finding phase of the 
criminal process;  
� Involv[ing] a face-to-face meeting with an admitted offender and victim 
and their supporters, although it may also take indirect forms;  
� Envision[ing] a more active role for victim participation in justice 
decisions;  
� [Employing] an informal process that draws on the knowledge and active 
participation of lay persons (typically those most affected by an offence), 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. See generally CRIMINOLOGY AT THE CROSSROADS: FEMINIST READINGS IN CRIME AND JUSTICE (Kathleen 
Daly & Lisa Maher eds., 1998) (a collection of feminist work in criminology by prominent scholars); see also 
Kathleen Daly & Hennessey Hayes, Restorative Justice and Conferencing in Australia, 186 TRENDS & ISSUES 
CRIME & CRIM. JUST. (2001) (discussing restorative justice). 
47. 
48. Daly, supra note 47. 
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but there are rules circumscribing the behavior of meeting members and 
limits on what they can decide in setting a penalty;  
� Aim[ing] to hold offenders accountable for their behavior, while at the 
same time not stigmatizing them, and in this way it is hoped that there will 
be a reduction in future offending; and  
� Aim[ing] to assist victims in recovering from crime [by playing a more 
central role in the restorative justice process and making use of other com-
munity resources].49 
A comprehensive discussion of restorative justice is beyond the scope of this 
Essay. But a growing number of feminists seeking an alternative to lengthy incar-
ceration have embraced it, even for crimes of violence against women.50 
See, e.g., FANIA DAVIS, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RACE AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: BLACK LIVES, HEALING, 
AND US SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION (2019) (writing about restorative justice); LINDA MILLS, VIOLENT PARTNERS: 
A BREAKTHROUGH PLAN FOR ENDING THE CYCLE OF ABUSE (2008) [hereinafter MILLS, VIOLENT PARTNERS] 
(arguing for a healing-centered approach to intimate abuse that recognizes the complexity of violence); LINDA 
MILLS, INSULT TO INJURY: RETHINKING OUR RESPONSES TO INTIMATE ABUSE (2003) [hereinafter MILLS, INSULT 
TO INJURY] (addressing the complex dynamics of intimate abuse and incorporating restorative justice methods 
that focus on healing and transformation rather than shame or punishment); Daly, The Limits of Restorative 
Justice, supra note 47; Paul Tullis, Can Forgiveness Play a Role in Criminal Justice? N.Y. TIMES MAG., (Jan. 4, 
2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/06/magazine/can-forgiveness-play-a-role-in-criminal-justice.html 
(describing the life and work of Sujatha Baliga, a former public defender who had been sexually abused by 
her father and who directs a restorative justice project at the National Council on Crime and Delinquency in 
Oakland, CA). 
Feminists concerned about mass incarceration and its disproportionate 
impact on minority communities have also become active in the prison aboli-
tion movement. The most prominent are Ruth Wilson Gilmore,51 Angela Y. 
Davis,52 and Beth Ritchie,53 
See, e.g., Beth E. Richie, Reimagining the Movement to End Gender Violence: Anti-racism, Prison 
Abolition, Women of Color Feminisms, and Other Radical Visions of Justice, 5 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. 
REV. 257 (2015) (arguing that ending gender violence is consistent with prison abolition); Beth E. Ritchie, How 
Anti-violence Activism Taught Me to Become a Prison Abolitionist, FEMINIST WIRE (June 21, 2014), https:// 
www.thefeministwire.com/2014/01/how-anti-violence-activism-taught-me-to-become-a-prison-abolitionist/ 
(embracing the “feminist prison abolition project” as the best way to undo the harm that state violence has 
perpetrated and empower communities to redress gendered violence). 
three scholars who identify as “black, radical, fem-
inist intellectuals.”54 
Rachel Kushner, Is Prison Necessary? Ruth Wilson Gilmore Might Change Your Mind, N.Y. TIMES MAG. 
(April 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/17/magazine/prison-abolition-ruth-wilson-gilmore.html. 
Gilmore, an influential figure in the movement,55 explains the basic premise of 
prison abolition in distinctly feminist terms. She believes if we as a society lived in 
49. Id. 
50. 
51. See generally RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND OPPOSITION IN 
GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA (2007) (analyzing the political economy of mass incarceration in California). 
52. See generally ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? (2003) (arguing that, like the social 
movements that led to the end of slavery, de jure segregation, and the convict-lease system, it is time for an 
abolition movement to end the prison system); ANGELA Y. DAVIS AS TOLD TO EDUARDO MENDIETA & CHAD 
KAUTZER, ABOLITION DEMOCRACY: BEYOND EMPIRE, PRISONS, AND TORTURE (2005) [hereinafter DAVIS, 
ABOLITION DEMOCRACY] (interviewing Davis on prison abolition and other matters of political and social 
justice). 
53. 
54. 
55. Id. 
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a way that consistently reflected how precious life is, there would be considerably 
less violent crime.56 “[W]here life is precious, life is precious,” she says.57 Instead, 
when we “behave in a punitive and violent and life-annihilating way toward people 
who hurt people,” we perpetuate the problem.58 If only we lived up to our values, 
people who were tempted to resort to violence would learn that “behaving in a vio-
lent and life-annihilating way is not a solution.”59 
Prison abolition as a movement is provocative because it sounds absolute—no 
prison for anyone, ever, no matter how dangerous they are. But, in practice, it is 
both a long-term aspirational goal and on-the-ground social policy that “call[s] for 
government investment in jobs, education, housing, and health care.”60 Abolition 
means not just closing prisons, but reinvigorating the vital systems of support that 
have frayed in many communities, furthering inequality and despair.61 It is a 
“theory of change.”62 
Feminist legal scholars like Allegra McLeod have also advanced this fundamen-
tally radical theory of change, which “presents a formidable challenge to existing 
ideas of legal justice.”63 McLeod writes: 
Whereas reformist efforts aim to redress extreme abuse or dysfunction in the 
criminal process without further destabilizing existing legal and social 
systems—often by trading reduced severity for certain “nonviolent offenders” 
in exchange for increased punitiveness toward others—abolitionist measures 
recognize justice as attainable only through a more thorough transformation 
of our political, social, and economic lives. To realize justice in abolitionist 
terms thus entails a holistic engagement with the structural conditions that 
give rise to suffering, as well as the interpersonal dynamics involved in vio-
lence . . . Whereas conventional accounts of legal justice emphasize the 
administration of justice through individualized adjudication and correspond-
ing punishment or remuneration . . . abolitionist justice offers a more compel-
ling and material effort to realize justice—one where punishment is 
abandoned in favor of accountability and repair, and where discriminatory 
criminal law enforcement is replaced with practices addressing the systemic 
bases of inequality, poverty, and violence.64   
56. Id. 
57. Id. (quoting Ruth Wilson Gilmore). 
58. Id. 
59. Id. (quoting Ruth Wilson Gilmore). 
60. Id. 
61. See id. 
62. Id. (quoting Michelle Alexander). 
63. Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1613, 1616 (2019); see also 
Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156, 1161 (2015) (bringing 
prison abolition into conversation with criminal justice theory). 
64. McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, supra note 63, at 1616. 
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Other prominent feminist legal scholars have expressed support for prison aboli-
tion as well.65 There might be a scholarly movement afoot. 
Feminists who have rejected carceral feminism for restorative justice or prison 
abolition understand that the cycle of sexual violence often begins in our most 
cherished institutions: family, church, schools, and the military.66 It is an institu-
tional, and not merely individual, problem. They also understand that over- 
criminalization and mass incarceration disproportionately burden women of color, 
whether from their own rising incarceration numbers67 
Data shows that women in jails are the fastest growing population within the justice system, skyrocketing 
nearly 1,300 percent (from fewer than 8000 in 1970 to 110,000 in 2014). See Women Behind Bars, VERA INST. 
JUST. (June 21, 2016), https://www.vera.org/the-human-toll-of-jail/inmate-turned-advocate/women-behind-bars. 
or the numbers of their 
sons, brothers, husbands, and fathers in the system.68 
See Ashley Nellis, The Color of Justice: Racial and Ethnic Disparity in State Prison, SENT’G PROJECT 
(June 14, 2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/color-of-justice-racial-and-ethnic-disparity-in- 
state-prisons/. 
This is the kind of feminism I ascribe to as a defender: a feminism that is mind-
ful of the enormous and violent power of the state;69 one that understands that the 
causes of crime are complex and deep;70 and one that believes our worst, most re-
pressive institutions can and must be changed.71 
II. CRIMINAL DEFENSE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE #METOO ERA 
Criminal defense is much easier to define and far less multi-faceted than femi-
nism. This is because the professional obligations of criminal defense lawyers are  
65. See, e.g., PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN (2017) (arguing for a radical rethinking of 
criminal law enforcement in the U.S. and endorsing the prison abolition movement); Dorothy Roberts, 
Democratizing Criminal Law as an Abolitionist Project, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1597 (2017) (arguing that making 
criminal law democratic—and fully inclusive of black people—requires an abolitionist approach that will 
dismantle the criminal law’s anti-democratic aspects entirely and reconstitute the criminal justice system without 
them); Jocelyn Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice Through Contestation and Resistance, 111 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1609, 1623–24 (2017) (expressing support for prison abolition and otherwise “[d]ismantling the American 
carceral state”). 
66. See McLeod, Regulating Sexual Harm, supra note 32. 
67. 
68. 
69. See generally NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER (Martha Minow et 
al. eds., 1995) (examining law’s violence); ROBERT A. FERGUSON, INFERNO: AN ANATOMY OF AMERICAN 
PUNISHMENT (2014) (examining the violence and cruelty of punishment in America); MICHEL FOUCAULT, 
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans., Random House 1977) (arguing that 
prison has become part of a larger “carceral system” that has become an all-encompassing sovereign institution 
in modern society). 
70. See, e.g., MILLS, VIOLENT PARTNERS, supra note 50; MILLS, INSULT TO INJURY, supra note 50; see also 
Kathleen Daly & Meda Chesney-Lind, Feminism and Criminology, 5 JUST. Q. 497 (1988) (laying out the 
promise of feminist inquiry for rethinking problems of crime and justice and in building theories on gender and 
crime, understanding men’s violence toward women, and addressing gender inequality in the criminal justice 
system). 
71. See DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE?, supra note 52; DAVIS, ABOLITION DEMOCRACY, supra note 52; 
GILMORE, supra note 51. 
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rule-driven and largely unambiguous.72 A criminal defense lawyer is obligated as a 
matter of ethics to zealously pursue the client’s interest within the bounds of law.73 
The clear lines are an appealing part of criminal defense for me. Once I under-
take a case, I must act at all times in a client-centered way. As Lord Brougham 
famously declared—with a feminist tweaking of early nineteenth century 
pronouns: 
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of [her] duty, knows but one person in all the 
world, and that person is [her] client. To save that client by all means and 
expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst them, 
to [herself], is [her] first and only duty; and in performing this duty [she] must 
not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which [she] may bring 
upon others.74 
Of course, the question of whether or not to take on a case is a decision lawyers 
can freely make in this country75—except for public defenders and other court- 
appointed lawyers, who make this fundamental moral decision when they become 
indigent criminal defense lawyers. I consider myself a lifelong public defender as a 
matter of experience, inclination, and identity.76 As a defender, it is not for me to 
judge my client or the crime charged; my life’s work compels me to stand between 
my poor client and the ire of others.77 
I can’t help but be reminded of one of Pope Francis’s best lines from early in his reign as pope—“Who am 
I to judge?”—which was said in response to a question on gay Catholics. As Francis said, “If someone is gay and 
he searches for the Lord and has good will, who am I to judge?” Rachel Donadio, On Gay Priests, Pope Francis 
Asks, ‘Who Am I to Judge?’, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/30/world/europe/ 
pope-francis-gay-priests.html. 
There is usually more than enough hostility 
to go around when a person is accused of crime. 
Because a private lawyer makes a choice about the clients he or she repre-
sents, the decision to represent an alleged sex offender is open to scrutiny. I 
don’t think there is anything wrong with this, or with having to explain why 
one undertakes a controversial case generally.78 Lawyers have an obligation to  
72. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N, 2018) (the ethical rules governing the 
legal profession). 
73. See id. r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (“A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction 
or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate 
a client’s cause or endeavor. A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client 
and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”). 
74. 2 THE TRIAL AT LARGE OF HER MAJESTY CAROLINE AMELIA ELIZABETH, QUEEN OF GREAT BRITAIN, IN 
THE HOUSE OF LORDS, ON CHARGES OF ADULTEROUS INTERCOURSE 2–3 (Manchester, J. Gleave, Deansgate 
1821). 
75. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS § 3.05 (5th ed. 2016) 
(discussing lawyer autonomy in taking cases). 
76. I came of age professionally as a trial lawyer at the Defender Association of Philadelphia. My colleagues 
there remain my favorite lawyers. 
77. 
78. For an interesting exchange about whether lawyers should have to publicly justify their choice of clients, 
see Monroe H. Freedman, The Lawyer’s Moral Obligation of Justification, 74 TEX. L. REV 111, 111–12 & n.6 
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educate the public about law.79 
Take, for example, Harvard College Dean Ronald Sullivan’s decision to join 
Harvey Weinstein’s defense team in 2019, which provoked an enormous outcry by 
Harvard students, resulting in Sullivan’s removal as dean.80 
See Jan Ransom & Michael Gold, ‘Whose Side Are You On?’: Harvard Dean Representing Weinstein is 
Hit With Graffiti and Protests, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/04/nyregion/ 
harvard-dean-harvey-weinstein.html (reporting about the student outcry over Sullivan representing Weinstein); 
Kate Taylor, Harvard’s First Black Faculty Deans Let Go Amid Uproar Over Harvey Weinstein Defense, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/11/us/ronald-sullivan-harvard.html (reporting that 
Ronald Sullivan and his wife Stephanie Robinson would not be reappointed as Deans of Harvard’s Winthrop 
House). 
Sullivan agreed to rep-
resent Weinstein notwithstanding the fact that Weinstein was facing multiple accu-
sations of sexual assault and had become the public face of #MeToo. Indeed, these 
factors may have drawn Sullivan to the case.81 
See Isaac Chotiner, A Harvard Law School Professor Defends His Decision to Represent Harvey 
Weinstein, NEW YORKER (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/a-harvard-law-school- 
professor-defends-his-decision-to-represent-harvey-weinstein (Sullivan, in an interview, suggesting that he took 
Weinstein’s case because it raised important issues about the “rule of law” and because Weinstein is an 
especially unpopular criminal defendant). Sullivan stated: “I have represented people, both indigent and non- 
indigent, who are accused of very serious crimes. I think the system as a whole is better for such representation.” 
Id. Sullivan did not deny that he was being paid a substantial fee. See id. 
In addition to the cachet—and cash 
—of a high-profile case, when the mob gathers, defense lawyers often step up.82 
Sullivan’s rationale for taking the case was not exactly feminist. It was more a 
reflection of how he sees himself as a criminal lawyer. In response to a reporter’s 
question about why he decided to represent Weinstein, Sullivan replied: “I have 
been a criminal-defense lawyer since I started as a public defender in Washington, 
D.C. in the mid-nineties. I represent any number of people charged with crimes 
across the country.”83 When asked about whether he had concerns about represent-
ing people accused of sexual misconduct, “because the defense . . . so often takes 
the form of disputing women’s stories, making women out to be liars, [and] calling 
their credibility into question,” Sullivan was coy: “A hypothetical case could have 
that potential. I do not see that sort of conflict in this case. And that’s as far I can 
go,” he replied. When pressed about whether it bothered him that “these types of 
accusations are often responded to in this way,” he gave a lawyerly non-answer: 
It’s hard to answer that in the abstract. It’s unethical for a lawyer to make that 
sort of insinuation without a good-faith basis. So, if the question is whether 
(1995) (summarizing a debate between Freedman and Professor Michael E. Tigar). That debate centered on 
Professor Tigar’s representation of an accused Nazi death camp guard. See id. 
79. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N, 2018) (“As a member of a learned profession, 
a lawyer should cultivate knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in reform of 
the law and work to strengthen legal education. In addition, a lawyer should further the public’s understanding of 
and confidence in the rule of law and the justice system because legal institutions in a constitutional democracy 
depend on popular participation and support to maintain their authority.”). 
80. 
81. 
82. See generally DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 66–68 (2001) (recounting John Adam’s defense of 
British soldiers in the aftermath of the Boston Massacre). 
83. Chotiner, supra note 81. 
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one can willy-nilly attack credibility of complainants, that answer is no. There 
are a range of potential defenses in any sort of case, including sexual-assault 
cases, all of which do not rely on contesting credibility of complainants. Some 
clearly do, but others do not.84 
When the mob started coming after Sullivan—a privileged, highly educated, 
Ivy League mob that should have known better85—I was among those who 
expressed support for him. I argued that it is especially important to have good 
counsel when the accused is a social pariah, as Weinstein has become, and when 
the stakes are high, as they are in all sex cases.86 I identified myself as a feminist 
criminal defense lawyer. I acknowledged that sexual assault and harassment are se-
rious problems on college campuses.87 
One of Weinstein’s initial lawyers, Blair Berk, identifies as a feminist criminal 
lawyer.88 
Maria Perez, Harvey Weinstein Lawyer: As a Woman and as a Feminist I’m Very Proud of What I Do, 
NEWSWEEK (June 20, 2018), https://www.newsweek.com/blair-berk-harvey-weinstein-feminism-me-too- 
movement-987003 (Blair Berk, who represented Harvey Weinstein from 2017-2018, discussing her choice to 
represent him). 
She is concerned about the criminalization of (bad) sex, the infantiliza-
tion of women said to be “coerced” by powerful men, and the #MeToo slogan, 
“Believe Women.”89 She rejects the idea that “there [is] a sex that by definition 
only ever speaks the truth.”90 When asked whether she had any qualms about “rep-
resenting men accused of doing horrible things to women,” Berk replied that she is 
proud of what she does “as a woman, a feminist, and a criminal attorney,” and that 
her “first love is the Constitution.”91 
Donna Rotunno, the lead lawyer at Weinstein’s trial, also calls herself a femi-
nist.92 
Ed Pilkington, Donna Rotunno: The legal Rottweiler leading Harvey Weinstein’s defense,” THE 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/film/2020/feb/09/donna-rotunno-lawyer-leading- 
harvey-weinsteins-defense (noting that Rotunno calls herself the “ultimate feminist”). 
She, too, worries about the excesses of #MeToo, the “cultural pendulum 
swinging too far,” and the demise of “due process . . . and the presumption of 
innocence.”93 
Jan Ransom, She’s Harvey Weinstein’s Lawyer, and She Thinks #MeToo is “Dangerous,” N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/14/nyregion/weinstein-woman-metoo.html. Rotunno lost 
credibility as a feminist when she was asked in an interview for the New York Times podcast, The Daily, whether 
she had ever been sexually assaulted and she replied, “I have not. Because I would never put myself in that 
position.” Meghan Twohey, A Question That Almost Went Unasked: Our interview with the woman defending 
Harvey Weinstein. THE DAILY NEWSLETTER, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/14/ 
podcasts/daily-newsletter-weinstein-trial-coronavirus.html. 
84. Id. 
85. See Ransom & Gold, supra note 80. 
86. See Abbe Smith, How Can You Defend Harvey Weinstein? Duty., supra note 2 (explaining why it was 
important for Sullivan to represent the non-indigent Weinstein). 
87. Id. 
88. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. 
93. 
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I do not know whether I would have represented Weinstein had I been asked. In more 
than three decades of criminal law practice, I have never turned down a court-appointed 
case based on the nature of the alleged crime. But that is in the context of indigent 
defense; the fact that my clients are poor is a motivator for me. If I had been appointed to 
represent Weinstein, I have no doubt I would have been able to represent him zealously. 
But I am a salaried law professor with no need for a big pay day. I prefer to expend my 
energy on criminal defendants who might not otherwise have competent counsel. 
Of course, the individual motivations of criminal defense lawyers who identify 
as feminists vary. There are more than enough motivations to go around.94 But 
some cases challenge even the most committed feminist defenders, and cases 
involving alleged sexual or physical violence against women are a prime exam-
ple.95 These cases can be challenging on many levels.96 
In a previous article, I candidly discuss the challenges in “representing rapists” 
as a feminist.97 But I also argue that criminal defense, even on behalf of those 
accused or convicted of rape, is consonant with feminism.98 One example I cite is 
the amicus brief99 filed by a number of feminist organizations in Coker v. 
Georgia.100 The organizations on the brief were the American Civil Liberties 
Union; the Center for Constitutional Rights; the National Organization for Women 
Legal Defense and Education Fund; the Women’s Law Project; the Center for 
Women Policy Studies; the Women’s Legal Defense Fund; and Equal Rights 
Advocates, Inc.101 The first listed author is now-United States Supreme Court 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.102 
The brief points to the racist and sexist history of rape prosecutions in arguing 
against the death penalty for rape and “firmly rejected the notion that destruction 
of men’s lives served to protect and honor women.”103 The same thinking applies 
outside the death penalty context to the relentless caging, shunning, and shaming 
of sex offenders.104 
94. See HOW CAN YOU REPRESENT THOSE PEOPLE?, supra note 18 (14 essayists, half of whom are women, 
share their motivations for doing criminal defense work); Babcock, supra note 13, at 177–79 (offering a classic 
list of motivations for criminal defenders). 
95. I often say that representing rapists and racists are the two toughest challenges in criminal defense. 
96. See generally Smith, Representing Rapists, supra note 1, at 303 (the author candidly discussing the 
personal and professional challenges of defending men accused of sexual assault). 
97. See id. at 309. 
98. Id. at 300 (“One can be a feminist—in a deep and broad sense—and defend people who are accused or 
convicted of sex crimes.”). 
99. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curae Supporting Petitioner, Coker v. 
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (No. 75-7544), 1976 WL 181482. 
100. 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (holding that capital punishment for rape violates the Eighth Amendment). 
101. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curae Supporting Petitioner, Coker v. 
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (No. 75-7544), 1976 WL 181482. 
102. See id. 
103. Id. at 9. 
104. See Smith, Representing Rapists, supra note 1, at 257–64 (discussing the harsh punishment of all 
criminal offenders in the United States, including sex offenders). 
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But feminist criminal defenders must also recognize the persistent culture of dis-
belief and outright misogyny when it comes to rape and sexual assault—and other 
crimes against women as well—no matter the current traction of the #MeToo 
movement.105 Rape complainants (the vast majority of whom are women) are 
doubted and dismissed from the minute they engage with law enforcement because 
police and prosecutors don’t believe them.106 
Of course, male rape victims are also disbelieved. See Dave Philipps, Six Men Tell Their Stories of 
Sexual Assault in the Military, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/09/10/ 
us/men-military-sexual-assault.html (recounting haunting incidents of male rape in the U.S. military). 
This means that most rape cases do 
not make it anywhere near a courtroom to ultimately be defended by a feminist 
criminal defense lawyer.107 
See generally Barbara Bradley Hagerty, An Epidemic of Disbelief: What New Research Reveals About 
Sexual Predators, and Why Police Fail to Catch Them, ATLANTIC (July 22, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
magazine/archive/2019/08/an-epidemic-of-disbelief/592807/; see also Epstein & Goodman, supra note 40. 
In a disturbing and powerful piece of journalism in The Atlantic magazine, 
Barbara Bradley Hagerty reveals law enforcement’s utter failure to effectively pur-
sue rape cases.108 The statistics are distressing. In forty-nine out of fifty alleged rape 
cases, the assailant goes free.109 The police distrust women who report being raped, 
fail to conduct a meaningful investigation, fail to test rape kits (especially “ac-
quaintance rape” kits), and leave cases of serious sexual assault to rot.110 Some rap-
ists go on to rape again.111 As Hagerty remarks, “rape—more than murder, more 
than robbery or assault, is by far the easiest violent crime to get away with.”112 
It is important to note that defense lawyers have nothing to do with this grim 
reality. We are not the initial stumbling block for rape complainants. Whatever 
defense lawyers do in the course of a rape trial—constructing a defense theory, 
making evidentiary arguments, conducting cross-examination113—these trials are 
extremely rare, having little to do with criminal defense lawyers.114 
105. See Epstein & Goodman, supra note 40. 
106. 
107. 
108. Hagerty, supra note 107. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. The disrespect for women that underlies ineffective law enforcement in this context is stunning: 
[T]he skepticism shown by police and prosecutors—who are not juries, after all—is extraordinary. 
Officials don’t talk about their methods publicly, and rarely reveal their thinking, much less their 
motives or biases. But two cities—Detroit and Los Angeles—allowed researchers to read thou-
sands of pages of police reports and to interview detectives and prosecutors. What the researchers 
found is a subterranean river of chauvinism, where the fate of a rape case usually depends on the 
detective’s or (less often) prosecutor’s view of the victim—not the alleged perpetrator.  
Id. 
113. See Smith, Representing Rapists, supra note 1, at 290 (“[W]ithout mincing words, what defense lawyers 
do at trial on behalf of factually guilty rapists is impugn the very character of a truthful person who has been 
badly victimized.”) 
114. Sadly, trials of any kind are becoming increasingly rare in American courtrooms. See Lafler v. Cooper, 
566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012) (Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, referring to “the reality that criminal justice 
today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials”). 
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The culture of disbelief goes well beyond criminal law enforcement. No matter 
how credible the allegations of sexual misconduct, from Anita Hill to Christine 
Blasey-Ford,115 
See Danielle Tcholakian, That Was Then, This Is Too, VICE (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.vice.com/en_us/ 
article/pa9m39/from-anita-hill-to-christine-blasey-ford-that-was-then-this-is-too (trenchantly analyzing how far 
we have not come since Anita Hill was discredited in 1991); see also Mikayla Bouchard & Marisa Schwartz 
Taylor, Flashback: The Anita Hill Hearings Compared to Today, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2018/09/27/us/politics/anita-hill-kavanaugh-hearings.html (comparing the handling of Anita Hill’s 
allegations against Supreme Court candidate Clarence Thomas in 1991 with Christine Blasey-Ford’s allegations 
against Supreme Court candidate Brett Kavanaugh in 2018); Margaret Talbot, On the Attack, NEW YORKER (Oct. 
1, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/podcast/comment/on-the-attack (noting that “in certain ways, Ford’s 
experience was just as bad as Hill’s, and maybe worse.”). 
there is simply never enough “corroboration” of women’s credible 
accounts.116 This also includes lesser-known allegations (though they should not 
be) by women like Colonel Kathryn A. Spletstoser, a twenty-eight-year Army offi-
cer with four combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, who accused General John E. 
Hyten, President Donald Trump’s nominee for vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, of multiple instances of unwanted touching.117 
Helene Cooper, Two Prominent Women Defend General Against Sexual Assault Claim, N.Y. TIMES (July 
30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/30/us/politics/john-hyten-kathryn-spletstoser.html (reporting that 
Colonel Spletstoser was not allowed to testify in a public hearing, but two women supporting the General were); 
Helene Cooper, ‘I Have a Moral Responsibility to Come Forward’: Colonel Accuses Top Military Nominee of 
Assault, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/26/us/politics/hyten-assault-joint-chiefs. 
html (reporting that, in addition to other incidents of unwanted touching, Colonel Spletstoser recounted that 
General Hyten once entered her hotel room to talk and reached for her hand; she became alarmed and stood up, 
he then stood up too and “pulled her to him and kissed her on the lips while pressing himself against her, then 
ejaculated, getting semen on his sweatpants and on her yoga pants”). 
Even though there was “no 
evidence that she lied,” an Air Force investigation found no evidence to corrobo-
rate Colonel Spletstoser’s accusations.118 
Just because feminist defense lawyers defend the accused does not mean we 
have nothing to say about this awful reality. There is nothing to stop us from being 
outspoken about the deeply sexist and racist history of rape investigation and pros-
ecution in this country.119 There is nothing to stop us from demanding that serious 
sexual assault cases be pursued and arrests made. Feminist criminal defense law-
yers can also cheer on the progressive social change accompanying #MeToo: a 
broader awareness of the impact of sexual assault and harassment and the need for 
accountability. Maybe not while we are defending someone charged with a sex 
crime, but certainly in our off-hours. 
But we must also call out the excesses of #MeToo—of feminism run amok. We 
should never simply “take a woman’s word” when she accuses a fellow citizen of a 
serious crime. There needs to be due process. Not every instance of alleged sexual 
misconduct is the same. Some misconduct is worse than other misconduct, more 
damaging and dangerous. To suggest otherwise insults those who have 
115. 
116. See Talbot, supra note 115; Tcholakian, supra note 115. 
117. 
118. Cooper, Two Prominent Women Defend General Against Sexual Assault Claim, supra note 117. 
119. See generally Hagerty, supra note 107. For a thoughtful examination of the under-investigation and 
prosecution of murder cases involving young African American male victims, see JILL LOEVY, GHETTOSIDE: A 
TRUE STORY OF MURDER IN AMERICA (2015). 
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experienced serious sexual violence and makes a mockery of the struggle to end 
it.120 
See Kimberly Yam, Aziz Ansari Addresses Sexual Misconduct Scandal in New Netflix Special, 
HUFFPOST, (July 9, 2019), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/aziz-ansari-sexual-misconduct-netflix_n_5d24ef4 
ae4b0583e48287b94 (recounting allegations of sexual misconduct against comic Aziz Ansari by a woman who 
said she felt pressured to engage in sex with Ansari despite “verbal and non-verbal cues to indicate how 
uncomfortable and distressed she was,” and who later texted Ansari to say that “it may have seemed okay. But I 
didn’t feel good at all,” which Ansari addresses in a 2019 Netflix special); Jason Zinoman, Aziz Ansari Addresses 
Sexual Misconduct Accusation in ‘Right Now’, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/ 
09/arts/television/aziz-ansari-netflix.html (same). Ansari maintained that he believed the entire sexual encounter 
was consensual and “felt terrible that this person felt this way.” Id. 
Not everyone needs to be locked away forever. And not every sex offender is 
the same. Each one has a story and many have the capacity to learn, change, and 
make amends. 
It goes without saying that having concerns about due process, proportionality, 
and the individual nature of sex offending does not mean that those concerned are 
apologists for men who commit sex crimes or other crimes against women. 
Feminist defenders can and should raise broad institutional objections and defend 
individual clients—occasionally “apologizing” for them—without abandoning 
their other core commitments. 
III. FEMINIST CRIMINAL DEFENSE ILLUSTRATED: BROCK TURNER AND CALVIN 
WILLIAMS 
A. Brock Turner 
The Brock Turner “rape” case121 
The Turner case is generally known as the “Stanford swimmer rape case,” even though this is a 
misnomer. There was no rape as a matter of conventional criminal law—or under California law at the time— 
because there was no sexual intercourse. Turner’s pants were never removed and the evidence was that he had 
touched Miller’s genitals with his fingers after removing her underwear. See Daniel Victor, Brock Turner Wanted 
Only ‘Outercourse,’ Lawyer Argues in Appeal, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/ 
26/us/brock-turner-victim-outercourse-appeal.html. 
captivated much of the national press when the 
case was reported in early 2015.122 
For an excellent account of the Turner case, Stanford law professor Michelle Dauber’s crucial role in it, 
and the recall and removal of the sentencing judge Aaron Persky, see Julia Ioffe, When the Punishment Feels like 
a Crime: Brock Turner’s Twisted Legacy—and a Stanford Professor’s Relentless Pursuit of Justice, HUFFPOST: 
HIGHLINE (June 1, 2018), https://highline.huffingtonpost.com/articles/en/brock-turner-michele-dauber/. 
Regarding Dauber’s role in the case, the article explains: 
For instance, Barbara Babcock, who in 1972 became the first woman appointed to teach at Stanford 
Law School, questioned whether Emily Doe really had a problem with Turner’s sentence. She pointed 
out that Emily Doe had told the female probation officer she didn’t want Turner to “rot in jail.” Emily 
had explained in court that these words had been “slimmed down to distortion and taken out of con-
text,” but Babcock perceived a more malign influence: “Michele got ahold of her.” 
Emily Doe’s statement, too, was the subject of fevered speculation among the anti-recall crowd. 
“I can’t prove it, but I think Dauber wrote the victim letter,” [LaDoris] Cordell told [Ioffe]. 
Babcock echoed her suspicion. “It’s so sophisticated for someone who was so young,” she said. 
Persky’s lawyer, a fellow Stanford alum named Jim McManis, was also sure that Emily hadn’t 
written the statement. “A person whose identity I am not at liberty to disclose says that it was writ-
ten by a professional battered women’s advocate,” McManis explained. “I can’t verify it, but the 
person who told me this, I value her judgment.” 
I have spoken about the case several times in a 
120. 
121. 
122. 
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Id. Dauber denies this, however, and the reporter says the letter sounds like Emily Doe. Persky declined Ioffe’s 
request for an interview, “but in an emotional conversation with The Associated Press, he said he had no regrets 
about how he had handled the Turner case, and accused the recall campaign of reducing a complex criminal case 
to a hashtag.” Id. 
colleague’s criminal law course during a class on proportionality and have had 
numerous conversations about it with young women in their twenties and early 
thirties. On every occasion, the perspective I offered about both the crime and the 
punishment inevitably incited objection, outcry, and even anguish. The case seems 
to be a powerful touchstone for a certain cohort of women. This is why I have cho-
sen to talk about this case here. 
Stanford University freshman and varsity swimming team member Brock 
Turner, then nineteen, and a recent college graduate now known as Chanel 
Miller,123 then twenty-two, attended a fraternity party on the Stanford campus on 
January 17, 2015.124 
Tracey Kaplan & Jacqueline Lee, Jury Finds Former Stanford Athlete Guilty of Sex Assault on 
Unconscious Woman, E. BAY TIMES (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.eastbaytimes.com/2016/03/30/jury-finds- 
former-stanford-athlete-guilty-of-sex-assault-on-unconscious-woman/. 
Miller went to the party with her younger sister.125 
Elena Kadvany, Trial Begins in Stanford Sex-Assault Case, PALO ALTO ONLINE, (Mar. 17, 2016), https:// 
www.paloaltoonline.com/news/2016/03/17/trial-begins-in-stanford-sex-assault-case. 
Turner was 
there with friends from the swimming team.126 
Elena Kadvany, Character Witnesses Defend Brock Turner, PALO ALTO ONLINE (Mar. 28, 2016), https:// 
www.paloaltoonline.com/news/2016/03/25/character-witnesses-defend-brock-turner. 
The party featured heavy alcohol 
use, and both Turner and Miller were intoxicated when they encountered one 
another.127 Accounts diverge at this point. Because of how intoxicated Miller was— 
her blood alcohol level was three times the legal limit—she had no recollection of 
what happened between her and Turner.128 Turner maintained that he and Miller had 
kissed at the party and were on their way to his room when they both slipped and 
tumbled to the ground on a dirt path, which happened to be behind a dumpster—an 
oft-repeated fact.129 While on the ground, the two resumed kissing and fondling, 
and after asking and obtaining permission, Turner touched, or “fingered,” Miller’s 
genitals.130 
See Emily Bazelon, Why the Stanford Rape Trial Actually Represents Progress, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 
9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/09/magazine/why-the-stanford-rape-conviction-actually-represents- 
progress.html; Brock Turner Probation Report at 6, People v. Turner, No. B1577162 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 2, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/06/12/us/document-SentencingPacket.html; Ioffe, supra note 121; 
Kaplan & Lee, supra note 124 (reporting that Turner testified that he kissed and fondled Miller and asked her if she 
wanted him to touch her genitals, to which she replied “yes”). 
According to Turner, he believed Miller was enjoying what he  
123. See generally CHANEL MILLER, KNOW MY NAME: A MEMOIR (2019) (describing Ms. Miller’s 
experience as the victim of the crime). Ms. Miller revealed her identity when she decided to write a book about 
the case. 
124. 
125. 
126. 
127. Kadvany, Trial Begins in Stanford Sex-Assault Case, supra note 125. 
128. Id. 
129. See Ioffe, supra note 121. The dumpster—which seemed a random detail of the incident’s location, 
rather than the intended destination for nefarious conduct—added a sinister element to the allegations. 
130. 
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was doing.131 There was no evidence of sexual intercourse, just “digital penetra- 
tion,”132 to the extent there was penetration at all.133 
Swedish Grad Students Who Pinned Down Stanford Sex Offender Speak Out, L.A. TIMES (June 8, 2016) 
[hereinafter Swedish Grad Students], https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-stanford-rape-witnesses- 
20160607-snap-htmlstory.html. 
In the early morning hours of January 18th, two male Stanford graduate students 
from Sweden, who were riding bicycles, came upon the pair.134 They observed a 
man on top of an inert woman outside the Kappa Alpha fraternity house, thrusting 
against her.135 When they got off their bicycles, they saw that the woman’s skirt 
was up and she was wearing no underwear.136 Turner was fully clothed.137 Turner 
tried to run away, but they stopped him and called the police.138 The woman was 
“completely unresponsive,” was taken to a hospital, and woke up about three hours 
later.139 
Ray Sanchez, Stanford Rape Case: Inside the Court Documents, CNN (June 11, 2016) [hereinafter 
Sanchez, Stanford Rape Case], https://www.cnn.com/2016/06/10/us/stanford-rape-case-court-documents/index. 
html; accord Ioffe, supra note 121. 
She had pine needles in her hair and around her genital area.140 
Turner was booked on two charges—attempted rape and digital penetration with 
a foreign object—and was released on $150,000 bail.141 
See Incident Report and Felony Complaint, People v. Turner, No. B1577162 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 2, 
2015), http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1532973-complaint-brock-turner.html; Elena Kadvany, 
Stanford University Student Arrested for Attempted Rape, PALO ALTO ONLINE (Jan. 27, 2015), https://www. 
paloaltoonline.com/news/2015/01/27/stanford-university-student-arrested-for-attempted-rape. 
Nine days later, the Santa 
Clara County District Attorney’s Office filed five felony charges against Turner: 
rape of an intoxicated person, rape of an unconscious person, sexual penetration by 
a foreign object of an intoxicated woman, sexual penetration by a foreign object of 
an unconscious woman, and assault with intent to commit rape.142 
Elena Kadvany, Stanford University Swimmer Faces Felony Sex-Assault Charges, PALO ALTO ONLINE 
(Jan. 28, 2015), https://www.paloaltoonline.com/news/2015/01/28/stanford-university-swimmer-faces-felony- 
sex-assault-charges (reporting the new charges and explaining that the Stanford Department of Public Safety 
conducted an investigation and sent its findings to the district attorney for review, Stanford University launched a 
separate Title IX investigation into the incident, and Turner voluntarily withdrew from Stanford). 
On February 2, 
2016, Turner was arraigned and pled not guilty to all charges.143 
Elena Kadvany, Former Stanford Swimmer Pleads Not Guilty to Sexual-Assault Charges, PALO ALTO 
ONLINE (Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.paloaltoonline.com/news/2015/02/02/former-stanford-swimmer-pleads-not- 
guilty-to-sexual-assault-charges. 
The next month, 
two of the charges were dropped: rape of an unconscious person and rape of an 
intoxicated person.144 The case proceeded to trial on three felonies.145 
131. Bazelon, supra note 130; Brock Turner Probation Report, supra note 130, at 11; Ioffe, supra note 121; 
Kaplan & Lee, supra note 124. 
132. Digital penetration means “fingering,” or penetration by a finger. 
133. 
134. Id. 
135. Kaplan & Lee, supra note 124. 
136. Kadvany, Trial Begins in Stanford Sex-Assault Case, supra note 125. 
137. Id. 
138. Swedish Grad Students, supra note 133. 
139. 
140. See Sanchez, Stanford Rape Case, supra note 139. 
141. 
142. 
143. 
144. Kadvany, Trial Begins in Stanford Sex-Assault Case, supra note 125. 
145. Id. 
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The trial was hard fought. Miller, her sister, two eyewitnesses, medical experts, 
the defendant, and several character witnesses testified over a period of eight 
days.146 
See Jacqueline Lee, Woman Testifies Against Brock Turner for Sex Assault, MERCURY NEWS (June 3, 
2017), https://www.mercurynews.com/2016/03/18/woman-testifies-against-former-stanford-all-star-swimmer- 
accused-of-sexually-assaulting-her/; Elena Kadvany, Prosecution, Defense Strategies Emerge in Stanford 
Sexual-Assault Case, PALO ALTO ONLINE (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.paloaltoonline.com/news/2016/03/21/ 
prosecution-defense-strategies-emerge-in-stanford-sexual-assault-case. 
The jury deliberated for more than a day before finding Turner guilty of all 
three charges on March 30, 2016.147 When the verdict was read, Turner looked 
down in dismay and his mother “wailed.”148 
Prior to sentencing, the probation department conducted a presentence investi-
gation, during which a probation officer investigator spoke to Miller about the 
impact of the crime on her and what she wanted to happen to Turner.149 
Brock Turner Probation Report, supra note 130, at 5–6. Miller later disputed some of what was attributed 
to her in the report as “slimmed down to distortion” and “taken out of context.” Jacqueline Lee, Brock Turner 
Case: Probation Department Report Spared Scrutiny, MERCURY NEWS (June 3, 2017) [hereinafter Lee, 
Probation Report Spared Scrutiny], https://www.mercurynews.com/2016/06/15/brock-turner-case-probation- 
departments-report-spared-scrutiny/. 
Miller told 
the probation officer that both the crime and the trial were hurtful to her, but she 
did not want Turner’s life to be “over” as a result of his conviction.150 She also said 
she didn’t think he needed a lengthy prison sentence.151 According to the report, 
Miller also told the investigator that she wanted Turner “to be ordered to partici-
pate in counseling to ensure something like this never happens again.”152 
The report included Turner’s sex offender risk assessment score on a standard 
risk assessment instrument, the Static-99R, which placed him in the low-moderate 
risk category for reoffending.153 
Id. at 8–9. “Static-99R is a ten item actuarial assessment instrument created by R. Karl Hanson, Ph.D. 
and David Thornton, Ph.D. for use with adult male sexual offenders who are at least eighteen years of age at time 
of release to the community.” STATIC-99, http://www.static99.org/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2020). Turner scored a 
“3.” Brock Turner Probation Report, supra note 130, at 9. 
Deputy Probation Officer Monica Lassettre, who 
wrote the report, acknowledged the vulnerability of the complainant due to intoxi-
cation.154 But, in recommending a short jail sentence and probation, she also cited 
Turner’s “lack of a criminal history, his youthful age, and his expressed remorse 
and empathy toward the victim,” and that “this 20-year-old offender is now a life-
time sex registrant, his future prospects will likely be highly impacted as a result of 
his convictions, and he surrendered a hard-earned swimming scholarship.”155 
On June 2, Judge Persky sentenced Turner to six months in jail and three years 
of probation, registration as a sex offender for life, completion of a sex-offender 
146. 
147. Kaplan & Lee, supra note 124. 
148. Id. 
149. 
150. Lee, Probation Report Spared Scrutiny, supra note 149. 
151. Id. 
152. Brock Turner Probation Report, supra note 130, at 6. 
153. 
154. Lee, Probation Report Spared Scrutiny, supra note 149. 
155. Id. 
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management program, and prohibited him from consuming alcohol during 
probation.156 
Elena Kadvany, Brock Turner Sentenced to Six Months in County Jail, Three-Year Probation, PALO 
ALTO ONLINE (June 2, 2016), https://www.paloaltoonline.com/news/2016/06/02/brock-turner-sentenced-to-six- 
months-in-county-jail-three-year-probation. 
Although Judge Aaron Persky’s sentence was consistent with the probation offi-
cer’s recommendation, it prompted widespread outcry as overly lenient, sparking 
an ultimately successful recall campaign.157 
Liam Stack, Light Sentence for Brock Turner in Stanford Rape Case Draws Outrage, N.Y. TIMES (June 
6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/07/us/outrage-in-stanford-rape-case-over-dueling-statements-of- 
victim-and-attackers-father.html. 
A poorly worded sentencing letter by 
the defendant’s father did not help. He wrote that his son’s “life w[ould] never be 
the one that he dreamed about and worked so hard to achieve. . . . That is a steep 
price to pay for 20 minutes of action out of his 20 plus years of life.”158 
Michael E. Miller, ‘A Steep Price to Pay for 20 Minutes of Action’: Dad Defends Stanford Sex Offender, 
WASH. POST (June 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/06/06/a-steep-price- 
to-pay-for-20-minutes-of-action-dad-defends-stanford-sex-offender/ 
A lengthy 
but powerful victim impact statement by Miller went viral in response,159 with 
CNN’s Ashleigh Banfield spending half of her show doing a live reading of the 
statement.160 
Chris White, CNN’s Ashleigh Banfield Gets Emotional Reading Sex Assault Victim’s Letter On-Air, L. & 
CRIME (June 6, 2016), https://lawandcrime.com/high-profile/cnns-ashleigh-banfield-spends-half-of-show-reading- 
powerful-rape-victim-letter/. 
On June 6, 2018, California voters removed Judge Persky as a result 
of a recall movement led by Stanford law professor Michele Dauber.161 
Maggie Astor, California Voters Remove Judge Aaron Persky, Who Gave a 6-Month Sentence for Sexual 
Assault, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/06/us/politics/judge-persky-brock- 
turner-recall.html. 
Much could be said about the disturbing recall campaign against Judge Persky. 
Many commentators, even those critical of Persky’s sentence, voiced concerns 
about the dangers of the recall.162 
See, e.g., Paul Butler, Opinion, Judicial Recall Will Inevitably Lead to Harsher Sentences, N.Y. TIMES: 
ROOM FOR DEBATE (July 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/06/08/should-an-unpopular- 
sentence-in-the-stanford-rape-case-cost-a-judge-his-job/judicial-recall-will-inevitably-lead-to-harsher-sentences 
(arguing that, though he believed Persky’s sentence was too light, and the victim impact statement “brilliant” and 
moving, judicial recall based on one mistake is misguided); Editorial, The Case Against the Recall of Judge Persky, 
S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 11, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/editorials/article/Editorial-The-case-against-the- 
recall-of-Judge-12587849.php (calling the recall effort “ill-advised and dangerous” and noting that “[n]either justice 
for defendants nor the concept of judicial independence is served if judges are guided by their anticipation of public 
reaction instead of the letter of the law”); Mark Joseph Stern, This is How Mass Incarceration Happens, SLATE (Jan. 
16, 2018), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/01/the-dangerous-misguided-campaign-to-recall-the-judge-who- 
sentenced-brock-turner.html (arguing that the campaign to recall Persky is “well-intentioned,” but “incredibly 
dangerous” and will eventually harm poor minority defendants); see also Bob Egelko, Persky Warns Against the 
Dangers of Recalling Judges as He Fights to Keep His Job, S.F. CHRON. (May 8, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle. 
com/bayarea/article/Persky-warns-against-the-dangers-of-recalling-12898536.php (Judge Persky arguing that voters 
should remove judges who are crooked or inept, but not because they disagree with their rulings). 
Professor Paul Butler put it well: “The message 
sent by a recall would be that before an elected judge hands down a sentence, she 
should think about how popular her decision will be with the public.”163 
156. 
157. 
158. 
159. Id. 
160. 
161. 
162. 
163. Butler, supra note 162. 
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Consideration of the popularity of a sentence would inevitably lead to harsher 
punishment because, politically, it is safer for a judge to throw the book at a con-
victed criminal rather than give him a break—even when giving him a break is the 
right thing to do. The people who would suffer most from this punitiveness would 
not be white boys at frat parties. Almost seventy percent of the people in prison in 
California are Latino and African-American.164 Those groups bear the brunt of 
zealous punishment.165 Do we really want to live in a world in which perceived “le-
niency” by a judge leads to removal from the bench?166 
See generally Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding 
Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759 (1995) (discussing the 
politics of elected judges and the impact on judicial decision-making in capital cases); Dan Levine & Kristina 
Cooke, Special Report: Elected Judges More Likely to Affirm Death Sentences, Analysis Finds, REUTERS (Sept. 
22, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-deathpenalty-judges-idUSL1N11S0ZN20150922 (documenting 
that elected judges are significantly more likely to affirm death sentences than appointed judges). 
Judge Persky’s sentence is sound from the perspective of a feminist defender 
who believes that criminal punishment should be proportionate to the crime. A sen-
tence should not inflict more harm on an offender (and his family and community) 
than is absolutely necessary. The sentencing should reflect individual circumstan-
ces with an eye towards an offender’s rehabilitation and return to society. I believe 
the victim impact statement in this case is the kind of honest confrontation that 
could lead to a productive reckoning between the victim and her assailant, along 
the lines of restorative justice. 
1. Proportionality 
In discussing proportionality here, I do not mean to minimize the offense or 
suggest it is not criminal. But this was a case of digital penetration, not “rape” as 
it is commonly understood. Under some circumstances, digital penetration or 
penetration with an object can be as violent, intrusive, and traumatic as penetra-
tion by a penis.167 And forcible oral sex can be as violent, intrusive, and  
164. See id. 
165. Id. 
166. 
167. See, e.g., ALICE SEBOLD, LUCKY (1999) (a searing memoir about being raped while a freshman at 
Syracuse University). Sebold writes: 
He reached out and grabbed them—my breasts—in his two hands. He plied them and squeezed 
them, manipulating them right down to my ribs. Twisting. I hope that to say this hurt isn’t neces-
sary here. 
“Please don’t do this, please,” I said. 
. . . 
“Lie down.” 
I did. Shaking, I crawled over and lay face up against the cold ground. He pulled my underpants 
off me roughly and bundled them into his hand. He threw them away from me and into a corner 
where I lost sight of them. 
I watched him as he unzipped his pants and let them fall around his ankles. 
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traumatic as forcible vaginal penetration.168 
See generally SUSAN J. BRISON, AFTERMATH: VIOLENCE AND THE REMAKING OF A SELF (2002) 
(recounting Brison’s experience being repeatedly choked and struck in the head in the course of being orally 
raped); see also Lisa Taddeo, The Specific Horror of Unwanted Oral Sex, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2020, https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2020/02/13/opinion/harvey-weinstein-trial.html (recounting a disturbing incident of 
unwanted oral sex and comparing it to some of the allegations against Harvey Weinstein). 
However, crimes involving penetration by a penis ought to be punished more 
severely than crimes involving digital penetration because (1) generally speaking, 
penetration by penis is a more serious and invasive act; (2) penetration by penis is 
more likely to cause sexually transmitted disease; (3) vaginal penetration by penis 
can cause pregnancy; and (4) digital penetration of a woman’s genitals covers a 
range of conduct, some of which is “penetrative” only in the broadest sense. 
This last point requires clarification. Women’s genitals are physically compli-
cated. California law defines sexual penetration as “the act of causing penetration, 
however slight, of the genital or anal opening of any person” when done for the 
purpose of sexual abuse, arousal, or gratification.169 This means that there need not 
be vaginal penetration—merely touching of the labia—in order for there to be 
penetration.170 
In the Turner case, there was no evidence of vaginal penetration. The physical 
evidence, medical evidence, and defendant’s statements were that Turner stroked 
(or “fingered”) the complainant’s genitals. Because the case became known as the 
“Stanford Swimmer Rape Case,” many people have no idea that the case involved 
the use of fingers, not a penis, and likely only the penetration of the outer genitalia. 
He lay down on top of me and started humping. . . . 
He worked away on me, reaching down to work with his penis. 
I stared right into his eyes. I was too afraid not to. If I shut my eyes, I believed, I would disap-
pear. To make it through, I had to be present the whole time. 
He called me bitch. He told me I was dry. 
“I’m sorry,” I said—I never stopped apologizing. . . . 
“Stop looking at me,” he said. “Shut your eyes. Stop shaking.” 
“I can’t.” 
“Stop it or you’ll be sorry.” 
I did. My focus became acute. I stared harder than ever at him. He began to knead his fist 
against the opening of my vagina. Inserted his fingers into it, three or four at a time. Something 
tore. I began to bleed there. I was wet now. 
It made him excited. He was intrigued. As he worked his whole fist up into my vagina and 
pumped it, I went into my brain.  
Id. at 16–17. 
168. 
169. CAL. PENAL CODE § 289(k)(1) (West 2019) (emphasis added). 
170. People v. Quintana, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 235, 242 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that penetration of the labia 
majora was sufficient to prove penetration). 
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2. The Sentence Should Not Inflict More Harm Than is Necessary 
Turner’s counsel asked for a four-month county jail sentence followed by a 
lengthy period of probation.171 Prosecutors asked for a six-year prison sentence.172 
It is important to note that Judge Persky’s sentence of six months in jail also 
included lifetime registration as a sex offender.173 
Critics of Persky’s sentence might ask themselves whether it would really make 
a difference—to Turner, the victim, or the community—if a teen with no prior 
criminal record who had never before been incarcerated was caged in a state prison 
rather than the county jail. They should also have to explain why, if several months 
in jail is enough to teach this particular young man a lesson, a fifty-month sentence 
is necessary. 
In our no-sentence-is-too-long approach to criminal justice, we forget that any 
period of incarceration is traumatic for the person locked up—especially someone 
who has never been incarcerated before. A little goes a long way. We forget, too, 
that it is not just the individual who “does time” in jail or prison—his family, 
friends, and community often feel the weight of a loved one’s incarceration.174 
The only problem I have with the length of Turner’s sentence is that my poor 
black and brown clients rarely receive such a reasonable sentence.175 
Cf. Kate Taylor, By Turns Tearful and Stoic, Felicity Huffman Gets 14-Day Prison Sentence, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/13/us/felicity-huffman-sentencing.html (reporting about the 
first sentencing in the nation’s largest college admissions scandal and quoting David Singleton, executive 
director of the Ohio Justice and Policy Center, who noted that “there’s a different justice system” if you are rich 
and white, but “[s]ending Felicity Huffman to jail is not going to solve that problem”). 
Whatever one thinks of the number of months Turner served, lifetime sex of-
fender registration is a stringent and stigmatizing sanction.176 
Although sex offender registration is not considered “punishment,” Judge Persky noted at sentencing that 
it was “part of the price Turner will pay.” Tracey Kaplan, Brock Turner: A Sex Offender for Life, He Faces 
Stringent Rules, E. BAY TIMES (Sept. 5, 2016), https://www.eastbaytimes.com/2016/09/02/brock-turner-a-sex- 
offender-for-life-he-faces-stringent-rules/. California and South Carolina are the only states that require all sex 
offenders to register for life. Id. 
Even though there 
was no proof that Turner posed a serious threat of reoffending, he had to register as 
a sex offender and abide by strict rules, including residency and work restrictions 
and notifying the authorities whenever he moves, for the rest of his life.177 Any 
hope that Turner might serve his sentence, and thereby discharge his debt to soci-
ety and return to normal life, is futile. This lifetime requirement will keep his name 
and face in the public view forever through an easily accessible internet database 
that often includes offenders’ addresses and photographs.178 This sanction, 
171. Kadvany, Brock Turner Sentenced to Six Months in County Jail, Three-Year Probation, supra note 156. 
172. Id. (reporting that the prosecutor called Turner a “predator,” noted the “global ramifications” of the case, 
and asked for a state prison sentence). 
173. Id. 
174. See Chesa Boudin, Children of Incarcerated Parents: The Child’s Constitutional Right to the Family 
Relationship, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 77, 77–78 (2013). 
175. 
176. 
177. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(b) (West 2019). 
178. Kaplan, supra note 176. 
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rendering an errant teen a pariah for life, will do more damage than good and do lit-
tle to enhance “public safety.” 
3. Individual Circumstances 
Immaturity, alcohol, and sex are a toxic mix. I do not mean to suggest that alco-
hol excuses Turner’s conduct here. But it was a factor in this case, as was Turner’s 
age. Both of these were acknowledged in the judge’s sentencing remarks and in the 
probation report upon which his comments were based.179 
See Marina Koren, Why the Stanford Judge Gave Brock Turner Six Months, ATLANTIC (June 17, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/06/stanford-rape-case-judge/487415/; Brock Turner Probation 
Report, supra note 130, at 12. 
At sentencing, Persky said that determining a proper sentence here was “diffi-
cult.”180 He acknowledged the “physical and devastating emotional injury” to the 
victim.181 But the judge focused on traditional sentencing factors, such as Turner’s 
lack of any prior record, his youth, that he was unarmed during the crime, that he 
said he would accept the court’s sentence and comply with the terms of probation, 
and he would not be a danger to others if not imprisoned.182 He said the role alco-
hol played in the assault was “not an excuse” but was “a factor that, when trying to 
assess moral culpability in this situation, is mitigating.”183 He added that a prison 
sentence would have “a severe impact” and “adverse collateral consequences” on 
Turner.184 
Turner’s genuine remorse was also a factor at sentencing.185 Turner told the pro-
bation officer who drafted the presentence report: 
Having imposed suffering on someone else and causing someone else pain—I 
mean, I can barely live with myself. I can’t even get out of bed in the morning. 
I think about it every second of every day. Her [the victim] having to go 
through the justice system because of my actions just . . . it’s unforgiveable. 
. . . 
. . . I wish I could just take it back. I didn’t even deserve to talk with her, to 
interact with her. I can’t believe I imposed such suffering on her and I’m so 
sorry.186 
This was a young man capable of learning from his alcohol-fueled mistakes, and of 
changing. There were good reasons for a several-month jail sentence followed by 
probation. 
179. 
180. Koren, supra note 179. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. Brock Turner Probation Report, supra note 130, at 7 (first alteration and first ellipsis in original). 
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4. An Opportunity for Restorative Justice 
Although the victim later indicated that the presentence/probation report did not 
accurately reflect her experience,187 
See Elena Kadvany, Stanford Sex-Assault Victim: ‘You Took Away My Worth,’ PALO ALTO ONLINE (June 
3, 2016), https://www.paloaltoonline.com/news/2016/06/03/stanford-sex-assault-victim-you-took-away-my- 
worth (reporting the released impact statement in full); see also MILLER, supra note 123. 
her words show that she might have been a 
good candidate for a restorative justice approach. Here is how she talked about the 
case to the probation officer who wrote the report: 
I still feel a lot of anger because of what he put me through at trial. I want him 
to be sorry and express remorse. He attacked my personal life in whatever 
way possible and in the end, it didn’t work. I don’t experience joy from this. I 
don’t feel like I won anything. It was just the anger of hearing what he said in 
Court. It was devastating. I want him to know it hurt me, but I don’t want his 
life to be over. I want him to be punished, but as a human, I just want him to 
get better. I don’t want him to feel like his life is over and I don’t want him to 
rot away in jail; he doesn’t need to be behind bars.188 
According to the probation report, the victim wanted Turner to receive counsel-
ing and no longer reside in the Bay Area.189 
Imagine if, instead of an adversarial trial, during which the victim felt under-
mined and unheard, there had been an alternative proceeding that put her at the 
center. She could have had her say, confronting Turner verbally, telling him every-
thing that is in her victim impact statement. What if she had had a hand in crafting 
what Turner would have to do in order for him to one day be welcomed back to the 
community? 
Why is it so hard to contemplate such a proceeding in a case involving a young 
person who made a bad mistake—even if the mistake was a sexual assault? The 
stakes were high for Turner at trial, the consequences permanent. He will wear 
scarlet letter R (for rapist) evermore. It is no wonder Turner’s trial lawyer litigated 
the case hard. I would have done so, too. 
I do not know whether the victim in the Turner case will also be permanently 
scarred. I hope not. I hope Ms. Miller finds what she needs to get past this episode 
and have a full and happy life.190 I also do not think it is a helpful feminist narrative 
to say that a woman’s life is forever ruined by a sexual assault. This gives way too 
much power to perpetrators of sexual assault and buys into old sexist tropes (as in 
the archaic use of “ruined”). 
What would a feminist defender do in the Brock Turner case if there were no 
viable alternatives to trial and her client did not want to be convicted of a lifetime 
registration felony sex offense? Everything she could lawfully do to achieve an 
187. 
188. Brock Turner Probation Report, supra note 130, at 5. 
189. Id. at 6. 
190. She seems to have a strong support network. See generally MILLER, supra note 123. 
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acquittal. Even if the defender felt bad about it, she would have to figure out a way 
to deal with it. 
The one thing a feminist defender could not do is apologize to the complainant. 
To do so would be narcissistic. Complainants get to hate defense counsel; it’s the 
least we can do for them. 
But I confess that lately, after the trial and sentencing are over, I have 
approached and praised a few sexual assault and domestic violence survivors on 
their powerful victim impact statements. Maybe I’m losing my criminal defense 
bearings, but the women I approached seemed to appreciate the kind words. 
B. Calvin Williams 
As I was writing this Essay, I attended and testified at a re-sentencing hearing 
for a long-serving prisoner I will call Calvin Williams. The clinic I direct, 
Georgetown’s Criminal Defense & Prisoner Advocacy Clinic, conducts a weekly 
legal research and writing class for lifers at a Maryland prison and Mr. Williams is 
one of the facilitators for the class on the “inside.”191 
Criminal Defense and Prisoner Advocacy Clinic Info Sheet, GEO. U. L. CTR. (2019), https://www.law. 
georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/CDPAC-Info-Sheet-2019.pdf. 
I have come to know Mr. 
Williams well and could not think more highly of him. He is an extraordinary per-
son: a self-taught intellectual, a man of faith, a modest but inspiring leader, a loyal 
and generous friend, and a gentle soul. He has found meaning in mentoring others 
and doing what he can to provide hope in a bleak place. 
When he was in his early twenties, Williams was involved in the illegal drug 
trade. So were most of the people he knew in his ravaged urban neighborhood. 
There were turf wars. In the course of one such war, he went to the home of a 
woman he knew who was connected to a rival drug dealer, said he “wanted pussy,” 
and forced her to have sexual intercourse at gunpoint. He went to trial and was con-
victed of armed rape and sentenced to life. 
Williams has now served more than thirty years. He is deeply remorseful about 
his crime. His re-sentencing was the result of a compromise with the State of 
Maryland in lieu of pursuing a post-conviction appeal. Several witnesses testified 
at the hearing, including a forensic psychologist who found that Williams presents 
no danger to the community, two men who served time with Williams and now 
help former prisoners reenter society, family members, Williams, and me. 
Although the victim was contacted, she declined to appear or submit a victim 
impact statement. She had given a statement to a defense investigator that she 
believed Williams had served enough time and had no objection to his release. 
The courtroom was packed with Williams’ family and friends. It was moving to 
see so many people who loved him. His mother was dignified and self-possessed. I 
was struck by this because I am a mother too. The thought of my son being incar-
cerated is unbearable. 
191. 
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Defense counsel included a young lawyer who had met Williams when he was a 
Georgetown law student, and members of his law firm, including a senior partner. 
The prosecutor was out of central casting: a steely woman of a certain age who 
brooked no dissent. She had been a sex crimes prosecutor for much of her career. 
Her cross-examination of every single witness focused on the crime. “Mr. 
Williams held a gun to the victim’s head, did he not?” “This must have been terri-
fying?” “He then raped her at gunpoint?” “She has probably relived the rape over 
and over—there’s no end of her punishment, is there?” 
I resisted this last suggestion. “I don’t know the victim, so I can’t say,” I said. “I 
surely hope she has gotten past what happened to her those many years ago. I find 
people are often more resilient than we may think.” This didn’t sit well with the 
prosecutor. “Have you ever represented a rape victim,” she inquired. “Yes,” I said, 
“many times.” She looked incredulous. I explained that a substantial number of 
women who end up in the criminal legal system have been physically and sexually 
abused, and that I have also handled a number of “battered women’s self-defense 
cases,” in which rape was a feature of the domestic violence my clients had suf-
fered. “I don’t agree that every woman who has been raped is ruined for life,” I 
said. “Different women react differently; it depends on the woman and the 
circumstances.” 
Unfortunately, the judge agreed with the prosecutor. “But rape is the very worst 
thing that can happen to a woman—a traumatic, life-altering event—don’t you 
agree, Ms. Smith?” It was an opportunity to offer my point of view. I told the judge 
that I considered myself a lifelong feminist, I took sexual assault seriously, but no, 
I did not agree with that statement and didn’t think it was helpful to women. “Your 
Honor,” I said, “I accept that this was a serious crime that needed to be punished. 
But Mr. Williams has paid for his crime with more than three decades of his life.” 
Part of me wished the victim were there to say she is okay now. But maybe she 
would not have said that. 
One of the men who had served time with Williams and now worked with 
returning citizens, had the best reply to the prosecutor. “The crime doesn’t 
change,” he told her. “But the person does.” 
Williams was humble and thoughtful and moving on the stand. He said every-
thing there was to say. No one could doubt his sincerity. 
The judge reduced Williams’ sentence from life in prison to sixty years. 
Williams was relieved; he now has a meaningful chance at parole. I was deeply 
disappointed. Only in America is a “reduction” to sixty years in prison good news. 
I couldn’t help thinking something was terribly wrong with the prosecutor’s 
approach to the hearing and, especially, her inability to recognize Williams’ trans-
formation while in prison. She was the opposition, period. No doubt she considered 
herself an important “voice” for the victim (who may not have felt the same way 
the prosecutor did) and for all women who have been sexually abused. But this is 
exactly what is wrong with this kind of prosecutorial feminism: there is only 
blame, no belief in redemption, and never, ever, any forgiveness. 
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CONCLUSION 
A feminist perspective at its most inclusive and incisive has much to offer in an 
era of mass incarceration. A criminal defense perspective, with its commitment to 
due process, proportionality, and individualized justice, also has much to offer in 
the #MeToo era. Contrary to the “feminist cocktail party question,” together, femi-
nism and criminal defense make perfect sense. 
Of course you can be a feminist and a criminal defense lawyer. The real question 
is: knowing what we know about our deeply flawed and endlessly punitive criminal 
legal system, can you, and should you, be a feminist and a prosecutor?  
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